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INTRODUCTION 
Congratulations on your decision to acquire an asteroid! As 
you probably know, asteroids are rocky celestial bodies that 
travel the solar system in elliptical orbits around the Sun.1 Some 
asteroids are very small rocks, while others are huge bodies 
almost one thousand kilometers in diameter.2 Most asteroids 
remain in the Main Asteroid Belt between the orbits of Jupiter 
and Mars, while others wander the solar system in their own 
unique orbits.3 
This Note will analyze your legal right to acquire an 
asteroid and its resources. As we will explain, that right depends 
                                                                                                             
1 . By “celestial body,” this Note refers to objects originating in space, in 
accordance with the ancient distinction between such objects and those originating on 
Earth. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 15:40 (“There are also heavenly bodies and there are 
earthly bodies; but the splendor of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of 
the earthly bodies is another.”). However, “celestial body” lacks a firm definition in law. 
See e.g., FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 175 n.2 (2009) 
(describing the absence of a definition of “celestial body” in several treaties that use 
the term); see also Asteroids: Read More, NASA, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/
profile.cfm?Object=Asteroids&Display=OverviewLong [hereinafter NASA, Asteroids] 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (describing asteroid orbits around the Sun); Near Earth 
Asteroids, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL UNION (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.iau.org/
public/nea/ [hereinafter IAU] (describing asteroids as celestial bodies). 
2. See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1 (describing asteroids as ranging in size from 
952 kilometers to less than 1 kilometer in diameter); see also IAU, supra note 1 
(estimating that 15,000 Near Earth Asteroids (“NEAs”) have a diameter of less that 140 
meters). This Note expresses all measurements in metric units out of respect to the 
employees of National Aeronautic and Space Administration (“NASA”) who lost their 
Mars Climate Orbiter in 1999 because a contractor calibrated the measurements for a 
key spacecraft operation in feet instead of meters. See Robin Lloyd, Metric Mishap 
Caused Loss of NASA Orbiter, CNN (Sep. 30, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/TECH/space/
9909/30/mars.metric.02/; Mars Mission’s Metric Mixup, WIRED (Sept. 30, 1999), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/1999/09/31631 (describing the loss 
of the Mars Climate Orbiter due to confusion of imperial and metric units). 
3. See CAROLYN CROW, THE MAIN ASTEROID BELT 1 (2009) (explaining that the 
Main Asteroid Belt lies between the Mars and Jupiter orbits); see also NASA, Asteroids, 
supra note 1 (explaining that most asteroids orbit the Sun between Jupiter and Mars). 
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on whether anyone can own or use celestial resources. 
International law might recognize the claim of whichever 
person, natural or corporate, first acquires resources in space. 
Alternatively, the law might recognize some Earth-based 
authority’s sovereignty over celestial bodies, and allow that 
authority to govern the resources of the universe. 
The right to acquire property in space is not a strictly 
academic concept. In fact, it has staggering economic potential.4 
There are more than 500,000 known asteroids in Earth’s solar 
system, and many more await discovery.5 Some asteroids contain 
precious metals such as gold, platinum, and palladium—so 
much of these, in fact, that an asteroid mining venture could 
turn a profit by doing nothing more than delivering precious 
metals to Earth.6 Of course, asteroid prospectors might also 
diversify their businesses by distributing other asteroid 
resources.7 These include construction staples like iron and 
nickel, semiconductor components like silicon and aluminum, 
and fertilizer ingredients like nitrogen and ammonia.8 The most 
                                                                                                             
4. See SHANE D. ROSS, NEAR-EARTH ASTEROID MINING 4 (2001), available at http://
www2.esm.vt.edu/~sdross/papers/ross-asteroid-mining-2001.pdf (describing how 
chemical analysis of meteorites and spectral analysis of asteroid-reflected light indicate 
the presence of gold, platinum, and palladium and other metals); see also NASA, 
Asteroids, supra note 1 (asserting that there are more than 500,000 known asteroids in 
the solar system, and probably many more still yet to be discovered). 
5 . See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1; IAU MINOR PLANET CENTER, 
http://www.minorplanetcenter.net/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how the 
International Astronomical Union’s (“IAU”) Minor Planet Center at the Smithsonian 
Astrophysical Observatory has identified the orbits of more than 600,000 celestial 
bodies, otherwise known as “minor planets”). 
6. See JOHN BROPHY ET AL., KECK INST. SPACE STUDIES, ASTEROID RETRIEVAL 
FEASIBILITY STUDY 12 (2012) (asserting that an asteroid mission could expect to 
retrieve platinum group metals through chemical or physical processing); see also 
Kenneth Chang, In Pursuit of Riches, and Travelers’ Supplies, in the Asteroid Belt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, at D3 (asserting that a single spacecraft need not recover a large 
amount of platinum to turn a profit); ROSS, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that chemical 
analysis of meteorites and spectral analysis of asteroid-reflected light indicate the 
presence of gold, platinum, and palladium and other metals). 
7. See Michael Belfiore, How to Mine an Asteroid, 189 POPULAR MECHS. 8, 53–55 
(2012) (describing various uses of asteroid resources other than precious metals); 
Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (describing various uses of non-precious-metal resources); 
ROSS, supra note 4, at 6 (asserting that asteroid miners could also provide 
semiconductor materials for the photovoltaic solar panel industry). 
8. See Brian O’Leary, Mining the Apollo and Amor Asteroids, 197 SCI. 363, 363–64 
(1977) (explaining that optical studies suggest some asteroids contain large quantities 
of iron and nickel, and chemical analysis of meteorites and lunar samples indicates the 
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useful asteroid resource may be the least conspicuous: ice, which 
could supply water for spacecraft life support.9 Hydrolysis could 
convert asteroid water into hydrogen and oxygen, which are 
valuable as fuel and breathable air.10 Asteroids may also provide 
other materials to shield spacecraft from cosmic radiation, 
which currently makes deep space exploration too dangerous 
for humans.11 
Most asteroids orbit far from Earth—much farther than 
Earth’s Moon and other planets like Mars.12 Nevertheless, the 
physical characteristics of space travel make some asteroids less 
costly to reach.13 Large celestial bodies like the Moon and Mars 
                                                                                                             
presence of silicates, aluminum, nitrogen); Belfiore, supra note 7, at 55 (asserting that 
asteroid nitrogen and ammonia could provide valuable fertilizer); ROSS, supra note 4, 
at 1–4 (explaining that chemical and spectral analysis indicate the presence of iron, 
nickel, silicon, aluminum, nitrogen, and ammonia). 
9. See Belfiore, supra note 7, at 53 (explaining that carbonaceous chondrite 
asteroids are a good source of water, which could be cheaper to harvest in space than 
to launch from Earth); O’Leary, supra note 8, at 364 (explaining that chemical analysis 
of carbonaceous chondrite meteors indicates the presence of water); ROSS, supra note 
4, at 4, 8 (explaining that about half of NEAs (by mass) are water-rich carbonaceous 
asteroids, which could provide water for life support). 
10. See Belfiore, supra note 7, at 53 (describing how hydrogen and oxygen could 
provide fuel); see also ROSS, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that hydrogen and oxygen 
from asteroids could provide propellant and life support). 
11. See Rachel Kaufman, Astronauts Could Ride Asteroids to Mars, Study Says, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 10, 2011), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/
110210-mars-trip-asteroids-taxi-cosmic-rays-hitchhikers-space-science/ (describing 
physicist Gregory Matloff’s study published in Acta Astronautica, which argued that 
asteroids themselves can serve as vehicles to protect humans from galactic cosmic rays 
while transporting them through deep space); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 
(explaining that asteroid materials could provide necessary shielding to protect 
humans from dangerous cosmic rays in deep space). 
12. See CROW, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that the Main Asteroid belt, with its 
innermost limit at 2.12 Astronomical Units (“AU”) from the sun, is more than twice as 
far from the sun as Earth, which orbits at an average of 1 AU); see also Earth’s Moon: 
Facts & Figures, NASA, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.cfm?Display=
Facts&Object=Moon (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter NASA, Earth’s Moon] 
(explaining that the Moon’s average distance from Earth is 384,400 kilometers); Mars 
Fact Sheet, NASA, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/factsheet/marsfact.html (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter NASA, Mars Fact Sheet] (explaining that Mars’ 
minimum distance from earth is 55.7 million kilometers). 
13. See MICHAEL A. SEEDS & DANA E. BACKMAN, THE SOLAR SYSTEM 83 (2010) 
(explaining that escape velocity depends upon the mass and radius of the celestial body 
from which an object seeks to escape); see also Ceres: Facts & Figures, NASA, 
http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.cfm?Object=Dwa_Ceres&Display=
Facts&System=Metric (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter NASA, Ceres] (explaining 
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exert strong gravity, which would require a spacecraft on the 
surface to generate more thrust to reach “escape velocity” 
during liftoff.14 Asteroids, on the other hand, are smaller, have 
weaker gravity, and thus require much less energy to escape.15 In 
fact, a spacecraft’s encounter with most asteroids would be more 
like the docking and departure of a seagoing ship than the 
landing and takeoff of an aircraft.16 Asteroids are therefore cost-
effective destinations for round-trip missions.17 
One space probe from Earth has already landed on an 
asteroid, recovered a small sample of its surface material, and 
returned it to Earth.18 The probe was called Hayabusa, and the 
Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency used it to collect small 
particles on an asteroid named 25413 Itokawa in 2005.19 After 
Hayabusa gathered its samples, it separated from the asteroid, 
propelled itself back to Earth, and landed in Southern Australia 
in 2010.20 Previously, in 2001, a National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (“NASA”) probe traveled to asteroid 433 Eros, 
where it conducted analysis of the asteroid and transmitted its 
findings to Earth.21 NASA believes that by 2025 it will be possible 
                                                                                                             
that Ceres, the largest known asteroid, has an escape velocity of less than 0.64 
kilometers, per second (“km/s”)). 
14. NASA, Earth’s Moon, supra note 12; NASA, Mars Fact Sheet, supra note 12; SEEDS 
& BACKMAN, supra note 13, at 141, 157 (explaining that the Moon’s escape velocity is 
2.438 km/s and Mars’s escape velocity is 5.03 km/s). 
15. See NASA, Ceres, supra note 13 (explaining that Ceres has an escape velocity of 
less than 0.64 km/s); see also SEEDS & BACKMAN, supra note 13, at 559 (comparing 
Ceres’s size to Earth’s Moon). 
16. See Belfiore, supra note 7, at 52 (asserting that Spacecraft would dock with, not 
land upon, a small asteroid without appreciable gravity); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 
36 (discussing possible methods of anchoring to an asteroid to maintain contact with 
it). 
17 . See Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
asteroids/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (explaining that Asteroids’ low gravity makes 
departure easier). 
18. Ker Than, Hayabusa Spacecraft Returns with Fiery Show, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(June 14, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/06/100614-science-
space-asteroids-hayabusa-return-fiery/ (describing how the Hayabusa capsule returned 
from an asteroid and landed in Australia on June 13, 2010); Hisayoshi Yurimoto et al., 
Oxygen Isotopic Compositions of Asteroidal Materials Returned from Itokawa by the Hayabusa 
Mission, 333 SCIENCE 1116, 1116 (2011) (describing study of materials that Hayabusa 
retrieved from asteroid 25143 Itokawa in June 2010). 
19. Yurimoto et. al., supra note 18, at 1116. 
20. See id. 
21 . See NEAR Shoemaker, NASA, http://science.nasa.gov/missions/near/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2013) (describing how the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (“NEAR”) 
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to seize control of a 500,000 kilogram asteroid and tow the 
entire body back to Earth.22 
Besides the financial incentives for operators and investors, 
asteroid exploration could promote advances in science and 
engineering for all mankind.23 Asteroid research could help 
astronomers better understand the history of the solar system 
and the origins of life.24 Prospectors’ efforts to reach and exploit 
asteroids could also facilitate engineering progress.25 SpaceDev 
Corporation, which unsuccessfully attempted to build asteroid 
mining craft in the early 2000s, managed to develop the rocket 
motors that now power the private space vessel SpaceShipOne.26 
Autonomous missions to asteroids would require advances in 
navigation and electrolysis technology that could facilitate future 
manned missions in deep space. 27  The technology that 
                                                                                                             
Shoemaker probe achieved a soft landing on asteroid 433 Eros); see also Press Release, 
Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., NEAR Shoemaker’s Historic Landing on 
Eros Exceeds Science, Engineering Expectations (Feb. 14, 2001), http://
www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/pressreleases/2001/010214.asp. 
22 . See Jeff Hecht, NASA Mulls Plan to Drag Asteroid into Moon’s Orbit, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Jan. 2, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23039-nasa-
mulls-plan-to-drag-asteroid-into-moons-orbit.html (reporting that the National 
Aeronautic and Space Association (“NASA”) is considering a US$2.6 billion mission to 
capture an asteroid and drag it into the Moon’s orbit); see also BROPHY ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 5 (describing how a study indicates it would be feasible to return a 500,000 
kilogram asteroid to an orbit in vicinity of the Moon by 2025). 
23. See BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 11–12 (describing anticipated progress in 
space science and engineering related to asteroid missions). 
24. See Irene Klotz, Asteroid Mission to Look for Seeds of Life, DISCOVERY NEWS (Sept. 
27, 2012), http://news.discovery.com/earth/asteroid-sample-mission-120927.html 
(describing how Japanese scientists intend to study asteroid material to learn about the 
history of the early Solar System); Dawn at a Glance, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/
mission_pages/dawn/mission/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (describing how 
NASA intends to study two asteroids in order to learn about the history of the early 
solar system and the evolution of celestial bodies). 
25. See Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (reporting that SpaceDev failed to launch an 
asteroid expedition but succeeded in developing rockets for Virgin Galactic and 
SpaceShipOne); ROSS, supra note 4, at 6 (describing SpaceDev’s asteroid prospecting 
plans as of 2001); Propulsion Systems, SIERRA NEVADA CORP., http://www.spacedev.com/
ss_propulsion.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how Sierra Nevada 
Corporation’s hybrid rocket motors powered SpaceShipOne); Press Release, Sierra 
Nevada Corp., Virgin Galactic Joins in Sierra Nevada Space Systems’ Dream Chaser 
Orbital Space Vehicle Program (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.sncorp.com/press_more_
info.php?id=433 (reporting that Virgin Galactic will support global sales and marketing 
of the Sierra Nevada Corporation’s Dream Chaser Orbital Space Vehicle). 
26. See Chang, supra note 6, at D3. 
27. See Press Release, Dwayne C. Brown, NASA, NASA to Launch New Science 
Mission to Asteroid in 2016 (May 25, 2011), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/
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prospectors use to control asteroids might later help deflect 
dangerous asteroids from heading toward Earth, which means 
prospecting technology could literally save this planet.28 At the 
very least, prospectors’ telescopes would increase humanity’s 
chance of detecting an incoming asteroid.29 As the surprise 
explosion over Russia on January 15, 2013 made clear, the 
danger of undetected asteroids remains significant.30 
Commercial space activity is no longer a matter of science 
fiction. The space industry already includes fully operational 
companies like SpaceX, which brings customers’ payloads up to 
Earth orbit, and as-yet-unrealized ventures like Moon Express, 
which plans to mine resources on the Moon.31 Mars One, a non-
profit organization working to establish a colony on Mars, is one 
of many enterprises attempting to follow their lead.32 If you plan 
                                                                                                             
2011/may/HQ_11-163_New_Frontier.txt (asserting that a robotic mission to an 
asteroid will “pave the way” for future human missions in deep space); Asteroid Usage, 
PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/asteroids/usage/ (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2013) (asserting that various uses of space water can accelerate the 
progress of human spaceflight); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 12 (describing 
hypothetical use of electrolysis in space). 
28 . See Paul Marks, Asteroid Miners Want to Turn Rocks into Spacecrafts, NEW 
SCIENTIST (London), Aug. 2012, at 28, 30 (reporting Planetary Resources co-chairman 
Eric Anderson’s assertion that learning how to control asteroids is necessary for the 
future safety of the Earth); BROPHY ET AL., supra note 6, at 11–12 (asserting that 
processes developed to control and maneuver asteroids would directly contribute to 
planetary defense). 
29. Press Release, Peter H. Diamandis & Eric C. Anderson, Planetary Resources, 
Future Asteroid Mining Industry Will Provide Capability to Aid the Deflection 
of Potentially Hazardous Objects Near Earth (Feb. 14, 2013), http://
www.planetaryresources.com/2013/02/future-asteroid-mining-industry-will-provide-
capability-to-aid-the-deflection-of-potentially-hazardous-objects-near-earth/ (asserting 
that asteroid mining technology could help detect potentially dangerous asteroids). 
30. See Andrey Kuzmin, Meteorite Explodes over Russia, More than 1,000 Injured, 
REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-russia-
meteorite-idUSBRE91E05Z20130215; see also Monte Morin, Russian Meteor Not Related to 
2012 DA14, Scientists Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, at 3 (reporting that while 
astronomers were tracking the close approach of one asteroid to Earth, another 
asteroid approached from another direction and remained unnoticed until it exploded 
over Russia). 
31 . See Missions, MOON EXPRESS, http://www.moonexpress.com/missions.html 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (describing Moon Express’s intention to use of Moon 
resources commercially); Company Overview, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/
company.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how SpaceX provides space 
launch services). 
32. See Christina Chaey, Mars One Has Officially Raised “Millions” To Build the Red 
Planet’s First Human Colony, FAST CO. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/
3005255/fast-feed/mars-one-has-officially-raised-millions-build-red-planets-first-human-
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to acquire resources beyond Earth’s atmosphere, your most 
significant competitor is probably Planetary Resources, an 
American asteroid mining company based in the State of 
Washington.33 Planetary Resources intends to deliver asteroid 
products to customers on Earth and in space.34 The company is 
currently building satellite telescopes to identify asteroids for 
mining, and the bona fides of its leaders and employees indicate 
that it is serious. 35  Company president Chris Lewicki, for 
example, was the flight director for two NASA Mars rover 
missions.36 He leads more than thirty engineers from NASA’s Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, and his financial backers include two 
former chief executives of Google.37 
The technological and economic hurdles between private 
companies and asteroids are daunting, but would-be prospectors 
also face potential legal challenges. Scholars have suggested that 
the United Nations should hold sovereignty over territory and 
resources in outer space, and that prospectors should be made 
to acquire concessions, leases, or licenses from the United 
                                                                                                             
settlement (reporting on a non-profit organization attempting to raise funding for 
colonization of Mars); Human Settlement on Mars in 2023, MARS ONE, http://mars-
one.com/en/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
33 . See Mission, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
mission/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) [hereinafter PLANETARY, Mission] (describing 
Planetary Resources’ intention to make asteroid materials available for human use); 
Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (asserting that Planetary Resources intends to mine 
asteroids to support human activity on Earth and in space). 
34. See Chang, supra note 6, at D3 (describing Planetary Resources’s plan to use or 
sell asteroid resources on Earth and in space); PLANETARY, Mission, supra note 33 
(describing how Planetary Resources intends to supply human activity on Earth and in 
space). 
35. See Technology, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
technology/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (asserting that the satellites, called “Arkyds,” will 
identify target asteroids for prospecting); Marks, supra note 28 (explaining that satellite 
telescopes orbiting the Earth will seek out valuable asteroids). 
36. See Our Team, PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com/
team/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) [hereinafter PLANETARY, Our Team] (explaining that 
Chris Lewicki was flight director for Mars rovers Spirit and Opportunity); Kirk Johnson, 
A Start-Up Sees a Gold Rush Among the Stars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2012, at A12 (reporting 
that Mr. Lewicki spent ten years at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory before joining 
Planetary Resources). 
37. See Marks, supra note 28 (reporting that Planetary Resources employs more 
than thirty former NASA engineers and is backed by former Google executives); see also 
PLANETARY, Our Team, supra note 36 (describing various NASA veterans at Planetary 
Resources, and investors Larry Page and Eric E. Schmidt, Google’s CEO and former 
CEO, respectively). 
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Nations to exploit those resources.38 Part I of this Note examines 
the history of sovereignty and property rights over newly 
discovered resources on Earth. Part II considers recent attempts 
to establish international law for space exploration. In Part III, 
this Note applies historical precedent and existing law to argue 
that celestial resources should belong to the prospectors who 
claim them through physical possession and use, because no 
government on this planet has sovereignty in outer space. 
I. ABORIGINAL TITLE, EXTRATERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY, 
AND THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
In Part I.A, this Note considers the property rights of 
aboriginal settlers, focusing on the example of the first Pacific 
Islanders. Those pioneers, like today’s space explorers, left their 
homes in the most sophisticated vehicles their society could 
produce, and crossed the frontier to discover a series of rocky 
outposts that no people had previously claimed. Part I.B 
examines the claims of distant European nations over territory 
in the “New World,” including the Pacific Islands. European 
governments imposed extraterritorial sovereignty upon these 
lands in much the same way that organs of the United Nations 
have attempted to assert that body’s sovereignty over territory 
and resources in outer space. Finally, Part I.C discusses 
unclaimed minerals in the Earth’s deep seabed. Some scholars 
and jurists have argued that these resources are “the common 
heritage of mankind,” which is the same language the United 
Nations has used to describe space resources. 
 A. Aboriginal Title: The Reward of Discovery 
About 3,000 years ago, some men and women in canoes 
made their way across the Pacific Ocean, using the stars 
overhead as navigational aids, until they reached the islets of the 
Kwajalein Atoll, where they made their homes.39 If they had a 
                                                                                                             
38. See, e.g., WILFRED C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 398 (1962). 
39. See FRANCIS X. HEZEL, THE FIRST TAINT OF CIVILIZATION 3 (2000) (describing 
the settlement of the Marshall Islands); Ward H. Goodenough, Native Astronomy in 
Micronesia: A Rudimentary Science, 73 SCI. MONTHLY 105, 105–07 (1951) (describing 
indigenous celestial navigation in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands); CIA, Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, WORLD FACTBOOK (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rm.html (explaining that the Kwajalein Atoll is 
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cartographer among them, or a well-traveled fisherman, he or 
she would have learned that the only other lands within 
practical travelling distance were tiny strips of sand and 
vegetation very much like those of Kwajalein, isolated in the 
middle of Earth’s largest body of water.40 
When these aboriginal peoples took possession of 
Kwajalein’s islands, they established themselves as the rightful 
owners of those territories for as long as they chose to occupy 
them, under a principle that came to be known as aboriginal 
title.41 Courts in several countries have consistently ruled that 
indigenous inhabitants of territory hold aboriginal title to their 
land by right of first claim and continuous use.42 Aboriginal title 
acknowledges a first inhabitant’s right to territory irrespective of 
whether another government blessed the acquisition of that 
territory in the first place. 43  All that is required to prove 
aboriginal title is a demonstration of actual, exclusive, and 
continuous possession of the territory in question since time 
                                                                                                             
one of twenty-nine island chains in what is now the Republic of the Marshall Islands, a 
northern Pacific multiple-island nation about half-way between Hawai’i and Australia). 
40. See Pacific Ocean Map, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://events.nationalgeographic
.com/media/files/PACIFIC.OCEAN_GTM.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (depicting 
the location of Kwajalein). 
41. See John Briscoe, The Aboriginal Land Title of the Native People of Guam, 26 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (describing indigenous peoples’ right to first-occupied 
territory as “aboriginal title”); Julie Cassidy, The Enforcement of Aboriginal Rights in 
Customary International Law, 4 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (1993) (citing uniform 
state practice in Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and Canada as evidence that 
aboriginal title is a principle of customary international law); Kent McNeil, Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty, 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
253, 254 (1998) (describing Canadian recognition of aboriginal title to land as early as 
1888). 
42. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941); see also 
Snake or Piute Indians v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 543, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (holding 
that claimants can prove aboriginal title by establishing actual, exclusive, and 
continuous possession since time immemorial); Cassidy, supra note 41, at 59 (citing 
uniform state practice in Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and Canada as 
evidence that aboriginal title is a principle of customary international law). 
43. See Briscoe, supra note 41, at 4 (describing how aboriginal title depends on 
first use and continuous possession, not a foreign government’s assertion of 
sovereignty); Cassidy, supra note 41, at 59 (describing aboriginal title as a customary 
principle of international law that allows for the establishment of property rights 
without the grant of title by an outside sovereign). 
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immemorial.44 Aboriginal title is therefore a legal recognition of 
the property rights of claimants who were not preceded by a 
prior owner.45  
B. Terra Nullius and the Exercise of Remote Sovereignty 
More than 2,000 years after the original settlers arrived on 
Kwajalein, the inhabitants of nearby Guam were the first Pacific 
Islanders to encounter Europeans. 46  On March 6, 1521, a 
Portuguese mercenary named Ferdinand Magellan anchored his 
ship near Guam and brought a small party ashore in a landing 
craft.47 The residents of Kwajalein probably encountered their 
first Europeans fourteen years later, when on January 7, 1535, a 
crew of Spanish mutineers landed on the Atoll’s southernmost 
island.48 The Kwajalein Atoll, like other outposts throughout the 
Pacific, soon fell under Spanish dominion.49 
The European agents who first claimed these colonies and 
possessions did so in accordance with the principle of terra 
nullius.50 Terra nullius is closely related to aboriginal title because 
it allows the discoverer of unclaimed lands to acquire and use 
them.51 Aboriginal settlers are by definition the occupants of 
                                                                                                             
44. See Sante Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347; see also Snake or Piute Indians, 112 F. 
Supp. at 552 (holding that claimants can prove aboriginal title by establishing actual, 
exclusive, and continuous possession since time immemorial). 
45. See Sante Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347; Snake or Piute Indians, 112 F. Supp. at 
552. 
46. See HEZEL, supra note 39, at 1–2 (describing the first encounter between 
Magellan and the Guamian Pacific Islanders as the first contact between Europeans 
and Pacific Islanders); see also ROBERT F. ROGERS, DESTINY’S LANDFALL: A HISTORY OF 
GUAM 1 (1995) (describing how Guam became the first inhabited island in the Pacific 
known to Europeans when Magellan landed there in 1521). 
47. HEZEL, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
48. Id. at 23 (describing the arrival of the mutineers). 
49. Marshall Islands History, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/366624/Marshall-Islands/53997/History (last visited Oct. 23, 2013); 
History of the Marshall Islands, MARSH. IS., http://www.rmiembassyus.org/History.htm 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (describing how Spain ruled what came to be known as the 
Marshall Islands until 1899). 
50. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 11 (7th ed. 2010) (describing terra 
nullius as European explorers applied it); see also M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND 
GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1926) (describing 
territorium nullius as no sovereign’s land). 
51. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 50, at 11 (describing a discoverer’s rights 
under terra nullius); see also LINDLEY, supra note 50, at 2 (describing sovereign 
acquisition of territorium nullius). 
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lands with no previous resident, so one might call their lands 
“terra nullius.”52 As a legal term of art, however, terra nullius does 
not typically describe aboriginal occupation of truly uninhabited 
lands. 53  Instead, the term often refers to the mistaken or 
dishonest conceit by which Europeans justified their conquests 
of indigenous peoples’ territories.54 
Even though the rights of conquest and terra nullius 
granted spoils to victors, European monarchs did not depend 
exclusively on the speed and martial skill of their explorers to 
acquire territory.55 The Papacy, which exercised some power as 
an international authority in the late Fifteenth Century, 
occasionally granted to certain countries the exclusive right to 
explore and conquer designated areas of the world.56 Popes 
made these grants through Papal Bulls, which first asserted the 
Papacy’s dominion over the entire Earth, and then ceded to 
certain monarchs the right to claim territory in specified areas.57 
One of these Bulls was the Bull Inter Caetera of 1493, which 
divided the undiscovered world along a longitude boundary west 
of the Azores.58 The Bull Inter Caetera, reinforced by the Treaty 
                                                                                                             
52. Aboriginal Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/aboriginal (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (defining “aboriginal” as “being the 
first or earliest known of its kind present in a region”). 
53 . See SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF 
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 42 (1996) (describing post-
colonial accusations that European conquerors adopted the theory of terra nullius when 
they dispossessed native inhabitants). 
54 . See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (7th ed. 1997); Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology 
and Property Law in Early Australia, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 95, 97 (2005) (describing the 
extent to which British explorers and colonists relied on terra nullius to expel 
indigenous inhabitants). 
55. See HEZEL, supra note 39, at 8; KORMAN, supra note 53, at 8–9 (describing the 
Papal Bulls through which the Papacy assigned to various European sovereigns the 
exclusive right to explore and conquer territory). 
56.  HEZEL, supra note 39, at 8. 
57. See, e.g., Bull “Inter Caetera Divinae” of Pope Alexander VI Dividing the New 
Continents and Granting America to Spain (May 4, 1493), in CHURCH AND STATE 
THROUGH THE CENTURIES 153, 156–57 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall eds. & 
trans., 1967) (“[We, the Papacy] give, concede and assign to you . . . solely out of our 
largess . . . by the authority of Almighty God . . . all the islands and mainlands, found or 
to be found, discovered or to be discovered [within a designated area] . . . . And we 
concede them by the strength of the present document perpetually with all their 
dominions, towns, castles, localities and villages and all rights, jurisdictions and 
appurtenances to you and your heirs and successors . . . .”). 
58. See id. 
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of Tordesillas the next year, allowed Portugal to claim the ports 
and sea lanes around Africa’s coasts.59 The Spanish, being thus 
denied eastern access to the spice trade, embarked on a series of 
westward expeditions across the Atlantic in search of a round-
the-world route to the East Indies.60 This campaign eventually 
brought the Spanish to the Pacific, Magellan to Guam, and the 
mutineers to Kwajalein.61 
European notions of conquest and sovereignty had 
disastrous implications for indigenous peoples. 62  Weak 
populations were not the equals of strong European nations in 
the eyes of international law.63 Due to terra nullius and the naked 
ambition for conquest, international law in the Age of 
Exploration did little to prevent Europeans from running 
roughshod over the rights of natives.64 While the tragedies that 
ensued during centuries of European colonialism are well 
documented and beyond the scope of this Note, one tragedy is 
worth special mention. 65  The European monarchs who 
conquered territories like Kwajalein claimed for themselves an 
authority known as sovereignty, which included the exclusive 
                                                                                                             
59. See Treaty between Spain and Portugal Concluded at Tordesillas, Spain-Port., 
June 2, 1494 (reinforcing the division of territory for exploration between East and 
West, in accordance with the Bull Inter Caetera); Bull Inter Caetera, supra note 57; 
HEZEL, supra note 39, at 6–8 (describing treaty-based motivation for Spanish to explore 
westward). 
60. See HEZEL, supra note 39, at 6–8 (describing Spain’s westward expeditions in 
search of spices after Portugal monopolized the eastern route). 
61. See Id. at 2, 23 (describing Magellan’s travel to Guam and the mutineers travel 
to Kwajalein). 
62. See KORMAN, supra note 53, at 12 (describing how the right of conquest 
allowed European conquerors to fight unjust wars while asserting moral impunity); 
MALANCZUK, supra note 54, at 148 (describing how the right of conquest disadvantaged 
weaker societies). 
63. See KORMAN, supra note 53, at 12. 
64. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823) (Justice Marshall observing 
that “the character and religion of [North America’s indigenous] inhabitants afforded 
an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe 
might claim an ascendancy”). But see JOHN E. OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL 125 (1914) (“[E]very oppression now exercised on a 
helpless people depending on our magnanimity and justice for the preservation of 
their existence impresses a deep stain on the American character.”). 
65 . See generally MERCEDES MAROTO CAMINO, EXPLORING THE EXPLORERS: 
SPANIARDS IN OCEANIA, 1519–1794 (2012); see also FRANCIS X. HEZEL, STRANGERS IN 
THEIR OWN LAND (2003) (describing the harms that foreign conquerors inflicted upon 
Pacific Islanders). 
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rights to grant and transfer land.66 By claiming sovereignty over 
lands beyond their state borders, the Europeans exercised a type 
of power that the US Code describes as “extraterritorial 
sovereignty.”67 Extraterritorial sovereignty is a greater imposition 
of government power overseas than so-called extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which nations may occasionally assert over persons 
outside of their borders.68 Whereas extraterritorial jurisdiction 
would have given European governments the power to regulate 
the conduct of their explorers overseas, extraterritorial 
sovereignty gave these foreign governments the power to claim 
the soil on which their explorers stood, and stop indigenous 
people from using that territory except at the will of a European 
government or its colonial successor.69 Only in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries did international law finally recognize 
that indigenous peoples’ original occupancy of land established 
their legal title to that land. 70  When Kwajalein achieved 
independence along with its neighbors in the Twentieth 
                                                                                                             
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (describing how 
European sovereigns claimed for themselves the right to grant the soil, a right which 
the US Congress inherited from the British monarchy); Briscoe, supra note 41, at 1, 4. 
67 . 30 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2012) (distinguishing between “extraterritorial 
sovereignty” and extraterritorial jurisdiction). The distinction arose in a provision of 
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (“DSHMRA”), §§ 1401–1473, a law in 
which the United States recognized the rights of its citizens to mine for resources in 
seabed beneath international waters, also known as the deep seabed. See generally id. In 
this particular provision of the DSHMRA, called the “disclaimer of extraterritorial 
sovereignty,” the United States maintained its jurisdiction over United States persons 
and vessels exploring the deep seabed, but specifically disclaimed any assertion of 
sovereignty over the deep seabed itself, or its resources. See § 1402(a). This Note will 
return to the deep seabed in Part I.C. 
68. See id. (distinguishing between extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons and 
actions, and extraterritorial sovereignty over areas and resources); Brian L. Porto, 
Annotation, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 415 § 2 (2005) 
(describing extraterritorial jurisdiction as the extension of United States law over 
persons overseas); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (describing how Europeans dispossessed 
natives by asserting sovereignty over the New World).  
69. Cf. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574; Briscoe, supra note 41, at 1, 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3 (describing how European governments claimed for themselves the right to 
grant the soil, a right which the United States Congress inherited from the British 
monarchy and expressed affirmatively in its assertion of the exclusive right to regulate 
land and the commerce upon it); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1402 (describing a claim to areas 
or resources outside of a nation’s territory as extraterritorial sovereignty, and 
distinguishing that right from extraterritorial jurisdiction over person and vessels). 
70. See supra notes 41–45 (explaining how Aboriginal title exists independent of 
government action, and can be proved by actual, exclusive, and continuous possession 
since time immemorial). 
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Century, the Islanders decided to use their territory in a manner 
that is now of particular interest to space explorers, as we will see 
in Part III.B. 
C. Earth’s Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind? 
The age of land discovery on Earth has effectively ended.71 
Aside from a few newly forming volcanic islands, all of Earth’s 
dry land has been discovered and claimed by one or more 
sovereigns, or specifically reserved against claim by any 
sovereign.72 Nations also claim the waters immediately adjacent 
to their coastlines, as well as the seabed beneath their coastal 
waters.73 Territorial claims in coastal waters form a complex and 
controversial subject beyond the scope of this Note. For the 
purpose of analogy to outer space, it is only necessary to 
understand that nations exercise some sovereignty over the 
waters and seabeds adjacent to their coastlines, but there are 
other portions of seabed, far from any coast, that are not subject 
to any nation’s sovereignty.74 Scholars refer to these remote 
portions as collectively “the Area” or “the deep seabed.”75 
As Magellan traversed the Pacific in search of cloves from 
the Molucca Islands, he could have had no practical concern for 
the deep seabed more than eleven kilometers beneath him.76 He 
could not know that it contained nodes of gold, silver, nickel, 
copper, and zinc, as well as other resources.77 In Magellan’s 
                                                                                                             
71. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 50, at 11 (asserting that land discovery has 
effectively ended). 
72. Id. 
73. See generally George K. Walker, Filling Some of the Gaps: The International Law 
Association (American Branch) Law of the Sea Definitions Project, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1336 (2009) (describing various controversies between nations asserting conflicting 
claims to undersea resources). 
74. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and 
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2749, pmbl. (Dec. 17, 1970) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2749] 
(describing “the Area” outside of national jurisdiction). 
75 . See id.; see also 3 E.D. BROWN, SEABED ENERGY AND MINERALS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 3 (2001) (defining “the Area” or “the deep seabed”). 
76 . The average ocean depth is 4.3 kilometers. See Ocean Facts, NAT’L 
OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/
oceandepth.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (describing the Pacific Ocean as eleven 
kilometers deep in some areas). 
77. See NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEEP SEABED MINING, A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (Dec. 1995), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/
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time, and for centuries afterward, no legal regime existed to 
govern the exploration of the deep seabed.78 When people 
developed technology to reach the deep seabed in the 
Twentieth Century, the territory became the subject of 
competing interpretations of property rights in international 
law.79 
In 1970, the UN General Assembly attempted to assert 
international authority over the deep seabed and its resources.80 
The General Assembly passed a resolution entitled the 
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (“Declaration of Principles”).81 The Declaration of 
Principles called for the establishment of an international legal 
regime to govern the deep seabed “as soon as possible.”82 
In the same document, the General Assembly declared the 
deep seabed and its resources to be “the common heritage of 
mankind,” and forbade states and persons, natural or corporate, 
from appropriating the seabed by any means.83 The Declaration 
of Principles also called for states, persons, and corporations to 
refrain from exercising or acquiring rights over resources in the 
deep seabed, except when granted permission by the 
international legal regime that the General Assembly hoped to 
create.84 
According to the Declaration of Principles, the proposed 
regime for the deep seabed would govern all exploration of its 
resources.85 The regime would require that miners only explore 
                                                                                                             
gcil_dsm_87_20110607084359.pdf; see also Seabed Mining: The Unplumbed Riches of the 
Deep, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 30 (describing resources in the deep seabed). 
78. G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 75, pmbl. (“[R]ecognizing that the existing legal 
regime of the high seas does not provide substantive rules for regulating the 
exploration of the aforesaid area and the exploitation of its resources.”). 
79. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 75, ¶¶ 1–4 (describing deep seabed 
resources as “the common heritage of mankind,” to be collected and distributed under 
international supervision). Contra Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 
U.S.C. §§ 1401–1412 (2012) (allowing certain US persons to collect deep seabed 
resources for themselves). 
80. See G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 75, ¶¶ 1–4 (asserting international authority 
over the deep seabed and its resources). 
81. See id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. ¶¶ 1–3 (prohibiting national claims over the seabed). 
84. Id. ¶ 3 (prohibiting the acquisition of rights to the seabed). 
85. Id. ¶ 4 (describing the hoped-for regime). 
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and exploit the seabed for mankind’s benefit as a whole.86 The 
regime would also manage deep seabed mining to provide 
expanding opportunities for its use and ensure equitable 
sharing of its benefits among states, giving “particular 
consideration” to developing and land-locked nations. 87 
Industrialized nations refused to accept the Declaration of 
Principles as legally binding and declined to recognize its 
assertions as even an interim regime over the deep seabed, 
specifically rejecting the “common heritage of mankind” 
language.88 
In 1982, the United Nations attempted to establish a deep 
seabed legal regime when it proposed the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), which came 
into force (at least for the nations that ratified it) in 1994.89 After 
decades of negotiation and modification, UNCLOS still echoes 
the language of the 1970 Declaration of Principles: the deep 
seabed and its resources are “the common heritage of 
mankind.” 90  UNCLOS created the International Seabed 
Authority (“ISA”), a UN regulator to govern exploration in the 
deep seabed.91 UNCLOS required the ISA to distribute the 
proceeds of seabed mining to developing nations, and even 
directed the ISA to transfer seabed miners’ technology to those 
nations.92 UNCLOS also limited mining activity in the deep 
seabed to UNCLOS’s States Parties, or persons and companies 
                                                                                                             
86. Id. 
87. Id. ¶ 9 (explaining the purpose of the regime). 
88. See BROWN, supra note 76, at 3 (describing industrial nations’ objections to the 
G.A. Res. 2749). 
89. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also BROWN, supra note 76, at 4 (explaining 
that the General Assembly proposed UNCLOS in 1982). No western developed nation 
joined for twelve years, which led to a compromise “Protocol of 1994.” The 
compromise somewhat loosened the requirements for sharing deep seabed resources. 
Most developed nations, except the United States, accepted the compromise and 
joined UNCLOS. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes over the 
Protection of Marine Living Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
29, 36 (1997). 
90. UNCLOS, supra note 90, art. 136 (declaring the Area and its resources to be 
the common heritage of mankind). 
91. Id. art. 156 (establishing the International Seabed Authority). 
92. Id. arts. 140, 144, 160 (mandating the transfer of resources and technology 
from seabed miners to other nations). 
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they controlled.93 The only other organization allowed to mine 
the deep seabed under UNCLOS would be a new entity called 
“the Enterprise,” a UN-operated mining company, which would 
take funds and technology from other seabed miners, mine 
portions of the seabed where the other miners discovered 
resources, and distribute its profits throughout the world.94 
While the ISA currently operates from its headquarters in 
Jamaica, the Enterprise does not yet exist.95 
The United States has consistently rejected, through 
statements at the United Nations and in domestic law, the 
authority of any organization, including the ISA, to govern 
access to minerals beneath international waters.96 The United 
States, like other industrialized nations, asserted after the first 
UNCLOS proposal that the freedom of the high seas allows all 
states to engage in deep seabed mining without international 
regulation. 97  While many industrialized nations eventually 
compromised on the issue of seabed mining in order to accede 
to UNCLOS and gain its other benefits, the United States has 
still not ratified the Convention.98 UNCLOS opponents point to 
its common heritage principle and the ISA’s claim of effective 
                                                                                                             
93. Id. art. 153 (prohibiting mining by non-States Parties). 
94. Id. arts. 153, 170 (requiring seabed miners to identify multiple potentially 
valuable mining sites so that the Enterprise can choose to mine one of the sites itself 
using technology and startup funding provided by the miners). 
95 . See About Us, INT’L SEABED AUTH. (Apr. 2009), http://www.isa.org.jm/
en/about (describing the ISA organization, illustrating that the Enterprise does not yet 
exist). 
96. See Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 (1983), in 17 THIRD 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 243, UN Sales No. E.84.V.3 
(1984) [hereinafter US Statement] (statement by the United States of America); see also 
30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(12) (2012) (asserting that “exploration for and commercial 
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas 
subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of 
those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of international law”). 
97. See US Statement, supra note 96; see also BROWN, supra note 76, at 18 (describing 
the American position with regard to deep seabed mining). 
98. See Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement 
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UNITED NATIONS, 8 
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf 
(illustrating that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS); see also BROWN, supra 
note 76, at 4.  
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sovereignty over the deep seabed as some of the issues 
preventing ratification.99 
UNCLOS proponents have argued that international 
sovereignty over the deep seabed is necessary to establish a firm 
foundation of property rights so as to encourage exploration.100 
However, the experience of deep seabed explorers during 
UNCLOS’s development does not support this assertion.101 The 
United States’ refusal to accede to UNCLOS has not prevented 
American companies from claiming and exploring regions of 
the deep seabed in preparation for mining.102 As early as 1986, 
the US Mission to the United Nations formally notified the 
United Nations that the US government had given American 
companies permission to explore and exploit the deep seabed in 
the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, which lies five kilometers below 
the surface of the Pacific Ocean, about halfway between Hawai‘i 
and Mexico.103 Although technical difficulties still render seabed 
mining unprofitable, several business ventures have successfully 
extracted tons of manganese nodules, nickel, copper, and cobalt 
from the deep seabed in the eastern Pacific.104 
                                                                                                             
99. See Steven Groves, Opening Remarks, Panel V–Debate: Resolved: The Senate Should 
Give Prompt Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 
CONVENTION, US ACCESSION AND GLOBALIZATION 105 (Nordquist et al. eds., 2012) 
(criticizing UNCLOS and its common heritage principle). 
100. Ambassador John Norton Moore, Opening Remarks, Panel V–Debate: Resolved: 
The Senate Should Give Prompt Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention, in THE 
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, supra note 99, at 100 (arguing that the International 
Seabed Authority is necessary to establish the stable property rights necessary to enable 
American industries to invest in resource exploitation in the deep seabed). 
101. Steven Groves, The US Can Mine the Deep Seabed Without Joining the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 4, 2012, at 1, 5 
(asserting that United States non-accession to UNCLOS is not holding back deep 
seabed mining); INT’L SEABED AUTH., Draft Environmental Management Plan for the 
Clarion-Clipperton Zone, ISBA/17/LTC.WP.1 5 (Jan. 28, 2011), available at http://
www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/17Sess/LTC/ISBA-17LTC-WP1.pdf (describing 
current American efforts to mine the deep seabed). 
102. See Groves, supra note 101, at 5; ISA, supra note 101. 
103. See Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law 
of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 7 iii (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter Law of the Sea 
Bulletin] (describing how the Bulletin is a UN publication detailing the ratification 
status of the UNCLOS, as well as national laws, regulations and other actions affecting 
the law of the sea); see also Groves, supra note 102, at 17. 
104. See THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY 
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2009) (describing seabed mining, its 
successful extractions, and its economic failures). 
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The United Nations published the claims of US companies 
to the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in its Law of the Sea Bulletin, a 
registry of claims at sea.105 While the United Nations explicitly 
denies that it recognizes these claims, it stands to reason that 
publicizing claims reduces confusion and the potential for 
conflict.106 Controversies persist, but thanks to the Law of the Sea 
Bulletin and other dispute resolution mechanisms, conflicts 
between explorers are not as a problematic now as they were in 
the days of Magellan.107 
Proponents of the common heritage principle also argue 
that it will help preserve the deep seabed’s natural 
environment.108 They point out that the absence of international 
governance may have serious consequences for the current 
inhabitants of the ocean floor. 109  Areas like the Clarion-
Clipperton Zone probably contain more than one thousand 
species of plant and animal life, many of which are still unknown 
to the scientific community.110  Mining the ocean floor may 
disturb or destroy some of these species, and significantly harm 
their ecosystem.111 
II. LAW ON THE FINAL FRONTIER 
This Part examines the United Nations’ right to establish 
sovereignty over territory and resources in outer space, which we 
will call extraterrestrial (as opposed to extraterritorial) 
sovereignty. Part II.A discusses legal and policy reasons 
                                                                                                             
105. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, supra note 103 (listing claims to deep seabed 
resources). 
106. See id. (disclaiming recognition of publicized claims). 
107 . See, e.g., NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 342 (2004) (describing dispute resolution under 
UNCLOS). 
108. See UNCLOS, supra note 89, art. 145; see also BROWN, supra note 76, at 53 
(stating that the common heritage of mankind’s ratione materiae, or subject matter 
jurisdiction, extends to environmental protection). 
109. See Jan Magne Markussen, Deep Seabed Mining and the Environment, in GREEN 
GLOBE YEARBOOK 33 (Helge Ole Bergesen & Georg Parmann eds., 1994) (describing 
the dangers of deep seabed mining for flora and fauna on the ocean floor). 
110. See Brigitte Ebbe et al., Diversity of Abyssal Marine Life, in LIFE IN THE WORLD’S 
OCEANS 154 (Alasdair D. McIntyre ed., 2010) (describing flora and fauna on the ocean 
floor). 
111. See Markussen, supra note 109, at 33 (describing environmental harms arising 
from deep seabed mining). 
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supporting UN extraterrestrial sovereignty. Part II.B follows with 
the arguments against UN extraterrestrial sovereignty. 
A. Extraterrestrial Sovereignty 
For the first 4.5 billion years of its existence, the Moon was 
like all other celestial bodies in the universe: human activity had 
never disturbed it.112 The Moon orbited around the blue planet, 
controlling Earth’s tides and bearing the occasional impacts of 
asteroids, meteors, and comets.113 Then, on September 12, 1959, 
a rocket launched from the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, 
propelling a 359-kilogram metal sphere out of Earth’s 
atmosphere and onto a collision course with the Moon.114 This 
little unmanned spacecraft slammed into the Moon and 
scattered small metal objects bearing the Soviet Union’s 
hammer and sickle emblem across the lunar surface.115 Upon 
learning of the Soviets’ success, the US State Department 
immediately announced that the Soviet probe had not legally 
claimed the Moon.116 Although the Soviets explicitly denied that 
their landing constituted a territorial claim, the Luna 2 mission 
inspired efforts at the United Nations to establish an 
international regime for control of outer space.117 
1. The Outer Space Treaty 
The first UN effort to govern space activity culminated with 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
                                                                                                             
112. Earth’s Moon: Read More, NASA, http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/profile.
cfm?Object=Moon&Display=OverviewLong (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing the 
natural history of the Moon prior to the first human probe landing). 
113. See id. 
114. Luna 2, NASA, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/masterCatalog.do?sc=1959-
014A (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (describing the Soviet space program’s Luna 2 
mission). 
115. See id.; see also Max Frankel, Soviet Rocket Hits Moon After 35 Hours; Arrival Is 
Calculated Within 84 Seconds; Signals Received Till Moment of Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
1959, at 1 (reporting Luna 2’s successful landing). 
116. See Peter Kihss, US Rejects Any Flag-Planting as Legal Claim to Rule Moon, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1959, at 1 (reporting United States’ rejection of any hypothetical 
territorial claim). 
117. See Peter Kihss, Pleas Are Expected to Mount for UN Control of Outer Space, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1959, at 20 (reporting on United States’ advocacy for an international 
convention regarding space activity). 
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Other Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”), which the 
United States signed and ratified in 1967.118 The Outer Space 
Treaty is widely accepted.119 Some scholars contend that the 
Treaty is customary international law in its entirety, whereas 
others believe that only its first four articles are universally 
binding.120  
The Outer Space Treaty, along with four other treaties, 
established the basic principles of international law in outer 
space.121 Article I of the Outer Space Treaty describes outer 
space in general as “the province of all mankind,” and requires 
that space exploration benefit all countries, irrespective of their 
degree of scientific development.122 It goes on to demand that 
space be open for use and exploration by all countries, 
including access for scientific investigation. 123  Article II 
specifically prohibits “national appropriation” of celestial bodies 
by claim of sovereignty, means of use or occupation, or “any 
other means.”124 The Treaty applies to non-state actors as well: 
article VI holds States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty 
responsible for ensuring that the “national activities” of their 
non-governmental organizations comply with its provisions.125 
                                                                                                             
118. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; see also Kelly M. 
Zullo, The Need to Clarify the Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 2413, 2415 n.12 (2002) (describing the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty). 
119 . See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178 (describing the widespread 
acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty). 
120. See Eileen Galloway, The History and Development of Space Law: International 
Law and the United States Law, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 295, 300 (1982); see also Heidi 
Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
345, 352–53 (1995); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 180 (describing various opinions 
regarding the binding nature of treaty provisions). 
121. See Keefe, supra note 120, at 345 (describing the other four treaties as “the 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space of April 1968 (the Astronaut Agreement), the 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of March 
1972 (the Liability Convention), the Convention on the Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space of January 1975 (the Registration Convention), and the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
of December 1979 (the Moon Agreement).”). 
122. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. I (providing for free access to 
space). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. art. II (prohibiting national appropriation of space). 
125. Id. art. VI (holding nations responsible for the actions of their citizens). 
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The Treaty also asserts two environmental interests.126 It 
requires States Parties to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s 
environment through space activities. 127  It also admonishes 
States Parties to avoid harmful contamination of celestial bodies 
during exploration.128 
The Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition against sovereignty 
and appropriation in space has led some scholars to conclude 
that celestial bodies are res extra commercium, and cannot be 
owned.129 Some read the “national activities” provision as a 
prohibition against individual space property.130 
2. The Moon Agreement 
The United Nations established the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) at the urging of the 
United States in 1959. 131  COPUOS publishes documents 
applying international law to space.132 It also negotiates space 
treaties on behalf of the United Nations.133 In 1979, following 
initiatives by the United States and Argentina, COPUOS 
proposed to the General Assembly a document that became the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (“Moon Agreement”). 134  The Moon 
                                                                                                             
126. Id. art. IX (establishing environmental preservation rules). 
127. Id. (requiring States Parties to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s environment 
through the introduction of extraterrestrial material). 
128. Id. (requiring States Parties to avoid harmful contamination of celestial 
bodies). 
129 . See, e.g., LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 184 (describing scholarly 
arguments that celestial bodies cannot be owned). 
130. See, e.g., Carl Q. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited, in 9 
ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 217–44 (Nicolas Mateesco Matte ed., 1984) (asserting 
that no one can claim property in space). 
131. See International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 
1472, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 13 (Dec. 9, 1959) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
1472] (establishing COPUOS); United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html (last visited Dec. 11, 
2012) [hereinafter UNOOSA] (describing COPUOS and its location); see also Zullo, 
supra note 119, at 2417 (describing COPUOS and its establishment). 
132. G.A. Res 1472 (XIV), supra note 131, at 5. 
133. Id. 
134. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]; see also 
GANGALE, supra note 78, at 70 (describing how, ironically, the capitalist United States 
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Agreement, which entered into force for its States Parties in 
1984, declares celestial bodies and their resources to be the 
common heritage of mankind.135 It contemplates the future 
creation of an international regime, to govern all celestial bodies 
in Earth’s solar system as soon as the exploitation of space 
resources is about to become feasible.136 The regime would then 
ensure the equitable distribution on Earth of resources from 
space.137 
The Moon Agreement’s planned-for regime would 
effectively assert UN sovereignty over space territory by 
prohibiting States from recovering celestial materials, except 
samples for scientific research, and forbidding States from using 
areas of celestial bodies except as research stations, launch pads, 
and logistical staging areas.138 The Agreement pointedly rejects 
individual acquisition of property in or on celestial bodies.139 
The Moon Agreement also includes strict environmental 
provisions. 140  Under the Agreement’s proposed regime, 
explorers would only use celestial bodies to the extent necessary 
for scientific research. 141  The regime would also prohibit 
pollution of celestial environments and require States Parties to 
inform the Secretary General of all measures taken to ensure 
compliance.142  
                                                                                                             
inserted common heritage language into the Moon Agreement against the wishes of 
the socialist Soviet Union). 
135. See Moon Agreement, supra note 134, arts. 1 para. 1, 11 para. 1 (asserting 
that celestial bodies are the common heritage of mankind). 
136. See id. art. 11 para. 5 (requiring States Parties to establish the described 
space-governance regime as soon as resource exploitation is about to become feasible). 
137 . See id. art. 11 para. 7(d) (requiring the equitable sharing of celestial 
resources among all States Parties, “whereby the interests and needs of developing 
countries . . . shall be given special consideration”); see also Carol R. Buxton, Property in 
Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” 
Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689, 699 (2004) (noting that the Moon 
Agreement envisions a regime “reminiscent of the regime established to regulate 
exploitation of the seabed”). 
138. See Moon Agreement, supra note 134, art. 6 para. 2 (regulating removal of 
resources); id. art. 8 (regulating logistics sites). 
139. See id. art. 11 (prohibiting acquisition of property). 
140. See id. art. 7 (providing for the protection of the environment in space). 
141. See id. art. 9 (regulating scientific research in space). 
142. See id. 
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3. Property without Sovereignty? 
Another argument supporting UN sovereignty over celestial 
bodies is the theory that no one may own property except with 
the permission of a government.143 The argument goes that only 
a government with sovereignty over territory may grant property 
rights to an individual.144 A similar argument holds that while 
property rights are theoretically possible without a government’s 
grant of title, such rights are practically useless without the 
protection of a sovereign power.145 Since the Outer Space Treaty 
precludes national sovereignty in space, proponents of this 
theory assert that no one can acquire private property on 
celestial bodies.146 
Some scholars have argued that a new international legal 
regime is necessary to grant property rights in space. 147 
Proposals include a resource distribution mechanism modeled 
on the ISA, an internationally regulated market, and an 
essentially hands-off approach in which private companies claim 
asteroids (but not larger bodies like planets and moons) as 
chattels rather than real property.148 
4. American Asteroid Law 
The US government is apparently undecided on the issue 
of private property in space.149 However, a State Department 
                                                                                                             
143. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 184 (describing scholarly arguments that 
celestial bodies cannot be owned). 
144. Id. 
145 . See, e.g., GANGALE, supra note 78, at 10 (“Outside [a controlling legal 
regime], where a state of anarchy prevails, any claim to property must be defended by 
the force of arms; it is not a right, but a physical fact of occupation.”). 
146. See id. 
147. See, e.g., Zullo, supra note 118, at 2338 (arguing that a new authority is 
required to govern for-profit exploration). 
148. See Keefe, supra note 120, at 369 (describing the International Seabed 
Authority as a potential model for UN regulation in space); see also Lynn M. Fountain, 
Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of 
Mankind” Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753, 1774 (2003) (proposing a regulated market 
in space resources); Andrew Tingkang, These Aren’t the Asteroids You Are Looking For: 
Classifying Asteroids in Space as Chattels, Not Land, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559, 580 (2012) 
(proposing an unregulated market for asteroid acquisition). 
149. Compare Letter from Ralph A. Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced 
Technology, United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs to Gregory William Nemitz (Aug. 3, 2003) 
[hereinafter Braibanti letter], available at http://www.erosproject.com/exhibit01.html 
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letter arising from a unique legal controversy gives some 
credence to supporters of UN sovereignty in space.150 The issue 
arose in 2001, when aerospace consultant Gregory Nemitz 
published on a website his own claim to asteroid 433 Eros, just 
before NASA’s probe reached that object. 151  In a letter to 
Nemitz, NASA’s general counsel pointed out that, unlike deep 
seabed miners who enjoy American statutory law explicitly 
authorizing and recognizing their claims, space property 
claimants have no such protection.152 In a subsequent letter on 
the same subject, a State Department official categorically 
denied that that a person may own an asteroid.153 
Three years later, the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada rejected Nemitz’s claim that NASA should pay 
him US$0.20 per year to park its probe on “his” asteroid.154 The 
court found that the website on which he registered his claim 
conferred no property rights.155 Nemitz failed to demonstrate 
that either the Ninth Amendment or the Tenth Amendment to 
the US Constitution provided a legal cause of action against 
NASA. 156  The court also rejected Nemitz’s assertion that a 
Congressional statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 42, which required 
NASA to encourage commercial use of space, established 
                                                                                                             
(last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (asserting that the Outer Space Treaty prohibits private 
property in space), with STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TECH., 96TH 
CONGRESS, AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND 
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES 465–66 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SENATE 
COMMITTEE REPORT] (advising Congress not to ratify the Moon Agreement in order to 
uphold property rights in space). 
150. See Braibanti letter, supra note 149 (asserting that the Outer Space Treaty 
prohibits private property in space). 
151 . See Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 
3167042 at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. Nat’l Aeronautics & 
Space Admin., 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005) (“There is absolutely no legal basis for 
asserting that such a[n online] registry creates a property interest in the asteroid.”). 
152. Letter from Edward A. Frankle, General Counsel, NASA, to Gregory Nemitz, 
Chief Executive Officer, Orbital Development (Apr. 9 2001), available at 
http://www.erosproject.com/exhibit02.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (citing Deep 
Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473). 
153. See Braibanti letter, supra note 149. 
154. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (finding that the Archimedes Institute, on 
whose website Nemitz registered his claim, specifically disclaimed any authority to 
confer property rights). 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
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Nemitz’s property right on an asteroid.157 Finally, the court held 
that neither the United States’ rejection of the Moon 
Agreement, nor its ratification of the Outer Space Treaty, 
created any rights for Nemitz to appropriate property in an 
asteroid.158 
B. Free Space 
In the dark, cold vacuum of space, a certain gray rock orbits 
the Sun in an elliptical pattern never closer than 134 million 
kilometers from the yellow star.159 On Earth, the rock is known 
as asteroid 1999 RQ36, and the best estimate of modern science 
is that its natural orbit will never bring it closer than 445,738 
kilometers from the Vienna International Center, where 
COPUOS holds its sessions.160 As of this writing, 1999 RQ36 is 
several million kilometers away from Vienna, and yet the Moon 
Agreement asserts that the United Nations and COPUOS should 
exercise sovereignty over this object and others like it.161 
1. The Limits of the Outer Space Treaty 
The most significant space convention, the Outer Space 
Treaty, lacks any explicit mention of property rights.162 It does 
not, however, specifically reject individual or corporate property 
in space.163 The treaty only prohibits “national appropriation” of 
space by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or other 
                                                                                                             
157. See id. 
158. See id. at *2. 
159 . 1011955 1999 RQ36 Earth Impact Risk Summary, NASA, http://neo.jpl.
nasa.gov/risk/a101955.html (last visited March 3, 2013) (describing the physical 
properties of 1999 RQ36, including its orbital pattern). 
160. See id.; UNOOSA, supra note 137 (describing COPUOS and its location in 
Vienna). 
161. See Earth Impact Risk Summary, supra note 159; UNOOSA, supra note 137; 
supra notes 140–52 and accompanying text (describing COPUOS and its attempts to 
prohibit private acquisitions of property through the Moon Agreement). 
162. Compare Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, arts. I, II, VI, with Moon 
Agreement, supra note 134, art. 11; see also Keefe, supra note 120, at 359 (explaining 
that the Moon Agreement is more explicit than the Outer Space Treaty with regard to 
barring ownership claims). 
163. See Keefe, supra note 120, at 359 (explaining that the Moon Agreement is 
more explicit than the Outer Space Treaty with regard to barring ownership claims). 
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means.164 The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty chose to limit 
this prohibition to nations, even though scholars at the 
International Institute of Space Law had suggested that the 
Treaty should prohibit “national and private appropriation.”165 
While the governments that acceded to the Treaty clearly gave 
up their own ability to claim space property for themselves, they 
did not give up their citizens’ rights to acquire such property 
privately. After all, human beings have a universal right to own 
property.166 Reading a categorical rejection of property rights 
into the treaty might contradict article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees the personal 
property right.167 
As the Outer Space Treaty recognizes, no government on 
this planet has sovereignty in space, which means that no 
government may grant or deny resources in space to anyone.168 
The Treaty does hold States Parties responsible for ensuring that 
their citizens obey its provisions, which prevent individuals and 
corporations from claiming property in space on behalf of their 
governments. 169  It does not, however, prevent those same 
persons from claiming property for themselves, because such a 
claim would not violate the treaty’s prohibition on national 
appropriation.170 
The Outer Space Treaty uses the words “province of 
mankind” to describe space, but this language does not mean 
                                                                                                             
164 . See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. II (prohibiting national 
appropriation). 
165. See Int’l Inst. of Space Law, Draft Resolution of the International Institute of 
Space Law Concerning the Legal Status of Celestial Bodies, in Proceedings, 40th 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
351 (1965). 
166. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3/217(III), art. 17 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights] (guaranteeing an individual’s right to own property); Keefe, supra note 
120, at 359 (noting that “[t]he literalist approach [to Articles II and VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty] is not popular because it is not always compatible with the intent behind 
the words found in the treaty at the time of drafting”). 
167. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 166, art. 17; Keefe, 
supra note 120, at 359. 
168 . See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. II (prohibiting claims of 
sovereignty). 
169 . See id. art. VI (holding States Parties responsible for their citizens’ 
compliance with the Outer Space Treaty). 
170. See id. art. II (prohibiting national appropriation). 
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that mankind owns space collectively.171 The drafters of the 
Outer Space Treaty understood the “province” language to 
connote celestial bodies’ availability for use by all states on 
Earth, not joint ownership.172 The distinction between common 
use and joint ownership reflects philosopher John Locke’s 
articulation of communal and personal property on Earth: 
Though the Earth . . . be common to all men, yet every man 
has a Property in his own Person. . . . Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left 
it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joyned to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property.173 
The Outer Space Treaty’s admonishment that explorers 
avoid “harmful contamination” of celestial bodies could amount 
to an assertion of sovereignty over those bodies.174 However, 
reading this modestly worded warning in context indicates that 
the Treaty only asserted jurisdiction over explorers, and not 
sovereignty over celestial bodies and their resources.175  The 
article in which the environmental language appears, article IX, 
encourages cooperation and mutual assistance, and asks States 
Parties to act with due regard for each others’ interests.176 It goes 
on to discourage States Parties from interfering with each other, 
indicating that the “contamination” ban is meant to protect 
astronauts, not space rocks.177 
The arguments in this section have asserted that no 
international sovereignty over celestial bodies arises from the 
Outer Space Treaty. Even if such sovereignty did exist, it is not 
clear that it would apply to asteroids. The term “celestial body” 
                                                                                                             
171. See Zullo, supra note 118, at 2419 ((quoting U.S.S.R. Working Paper, Annex 
I, at 24–25, UN Doc. A/AC.105/115 (Mar. 28, 1973) [hereinafter U.S.S.R. Working 
Paper])) (describing the “province of all mankind” language as meaning that space 
resources are subject to “the undivided and common use of all states on Earth . . . not 
joint [ownership] by them.”). 
172. See id. 
173. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305–06 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press  2d ed., 1967) (1690). 
174. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. IX (admonishing explorers to 
avoid harmful contamination of celestial bodies). 
175. See id. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. 
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has no firm legal definition.178 It is not certain whether “celestial 
body” applies to all natural objects (including asteroids) or only 
to planets. 179  Planets, after all, are somewhat arbitrarily 
distinguished from asteroids by their size.180 The Outer Space 
Treaty and its provisions might therefore apply to Earth’s Moon 
and the named planets of the solar system, or to the moons 
circling those planets, or to any rock in space.181 
2. The Failure of the Moon Agreement  
COPUOS apparently conceded its inability to prevent the 
commercial use of space resources when, in 1976, the 
Committee refused to adopt an Italian proposal that would have 
prohibited the collection of celestial samples for economic 
profit.182 COPUOS later recommended the Moon Agreement, 
which attempted to lay the foundation for international 
sovereignty in space. 183  The Moon Agreement, however, is 
neither positive nor customary international law. 184  Only 
thirteen nations have ratified the Agreement, and none of them 
are independently space-competent.185 Ironically, the Union of 
                                                                                                             
178. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 175 n.2 (explaining that “celestial body” 
is not defined). 
179. See id. 
180. See Resolution B5: Definition of a Planet in the Solar System, INT’L ASTRONOMICAL 
UNION (2006), available at http://www.iau.org/static/resolutions/Resolution_GA26-5-
6.pdf (defining a planet as a body in orbit around the Sun, with sufficient mass for its 
self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium 
(nearly round) shape, and that has cleared the neighborhood of other bodies around 
its orbit). 
181. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 175 n.2 (explaining that “celestial body” 
is not defined). 
182. Report of the Legal Subcommittee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on 
the Work of its Fifteenth Session, U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/171 (May 28, 1976) (refusing to 
adopt an Italian proposal that would prohibit the return of scientific samples). 
183. See Moon Agreement supra note 134, arts. 6, 7, 9, & 11 (establishing the 
foundation for a UN regime that would exercise sovereignty over resources in space). 
184. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178; Standing Committee on the Status 
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, Annual Report, INT’L 
INST. SPACE L. OF THE INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL FED’N 6, 16 (2002), available at 
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/2002_StandingCommittee.pdf (recording that the only 
States Parties to the Moon Agreement are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the 
Philippines, and Uruguay). 
185.  See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178; Standing Committee on the Status 
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, supra note 184, at 6, 
16. 
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Soviet Socialist Republics staunchly opposed the Moon 
Agreement and its collectivist ideals, and the Russian Federation 
has done so as well.186 In the United States, a Congressional 
committee report listed the Agreement’s risks to property rights 
among the reasons not to ratify it.187 The committee asserted, as 
did other nations’ governments, that the property provisions of 
the Moon Agreement would discourage private investment in 
the space industry.188 
3. US Enterprises 
As noted above, the US government has not established a 
firm stance on the issue of property rights in space. Congress has 
encouraged commercial space activity through measures such as 
the 2010 National and Commercial Space Programs Law, which 
requires that NASA facilitate space commerce.189 On the other 
hand, State Department official Braibanti’s letter to Gregory 
Nemitz, which broadly rejected property rights in space, took 
exactly the position that the US Congress refused to adopt when 
it turned down the Moon Agreement.190 
In the Nevada District Court, which turned down his 
property claim, Gregory Nemitz explicitly declined to request a 
declaratory judgment regarding his ownership interest in 433 
Eros.191 Therefore, the court’s subsequent reasoning regarding 
the possibility of claiming property rights in space is probably 
                                                                                                             
186. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 178; Standing Committee on the Status 
of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, supra note 184, at 6, 
16; see also Gangale, supra note 78, at 70 (describing Soviet resistance to the Moon 
Agreement and its common heritage language). 
187. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 152, at 465–66 (expressing 
concern about “common heritage” property rights). 
188. See id. at 465–66; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 1, at 195–96 (listing 
concerns that the Moon Agreement would discourage space commerce). 
189. National and Commercial Space Programs, 51 U.S.C. § 20102(c) (2012) 
(encouraging commerce in space). 
190. Compare Braibanti letter, supra note 160, with SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 183 (illustrating discord between the State Department’s assertion that the 
Outer Space Treaty precluded property rights, and Conress’s rejection of the Moon 
Agreement due to its denigration of property rights in space). 
191 . See Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 
3167042 at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. Nat’l Aeronautics & 
Space Admin. 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that Nemitz had expressly 
disclaimed interest in a declaratory judgment regarding his ownership interest, and 
holding that he had thus failed to make a cognizable claim). 
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non-binding dicta. 192  Even if it were not dicta, the court’s 
reasoning is still quite limited. It only addresses whether 
Nemitz’s cited amendments, statutes, and treaties created his 
right to own the property that he claimed—not whether a 
general right to own property in space exists.193 
III. SLIPPING THE SURLY BONDS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
The preceding Parts have reviewed the history of discovery 
law on Earth and considered what principles might apply to 
resources in space. Acquiring celestial property may be as simple 
as making the first claim, or the United Nations may complicate 
the process by asserting sovereignty over space resources. Part 
III.A of this Note explains why UN sovereignty over celestial 
resources is inappropriate. This first subpart discusses the failure 
of the common heritage principle, the troubling implications of 
extraterrestrial sovereignty, and the distinction between 
environmental interests on Earth and in space. Part III.B shows 
how private space explorers can create a celestial mining 
industry without UN sovereignty. This portion of the Note 
points to aboriginal title as a precedent for establishing claims 
without a sovereign’s authority, and discusses the benefits that a 
first-claimant regime could have for mankind as a whole, 
including developing nations. 
A. “Take Them” 
Someday, perhaps in 2025, a prospecting spacecraft will 
leave Earth on a mission to recover valuable resources from 
space.194 As the prospector approaches its target, the United 
Nations or one of its subsidiaries may assert sovereignty over the 
target after deciding, with an eye toward the Moon Agreement, 
that resource exploitation in space is about to become 
                                                                                                             
192. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 227 (2013) (describing dicta as reasoning not necessary to 
the decision of the case, which is generally not binding). 
193. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1–2 (holding that Nemitz had failed to 
establish that the Ninth and Tenth Amendment “provide” a claim for denial of 
property rights, that 42 U.S.C. § 2451 “establishe[d]” legal basis for his claim, and that 
the rejection of the Moon Agreement or the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty 
“created” any right to acquire property in an asteroid). 
194. See BROPHY ET AL., supra note 11, at 5 (estimating that it will be possible to 
capture an asteroid by 2025). 
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feasible.195 Such an assertion would call to mind the arrogance 
of Gregory Nemitz, pointing at a light in the sky and saying 
“That’s mine,” as someone else’s spacecraft struggled toward 
it.196 Perhaps the United Nations will attempt to allocate regions 
of space to certain member states for exploration, just as the 
Papacy once assigned areas of the New World to European 
kingdoms.197 If the first prospector acquires its target asteroid 
and collects its resources, the United Nations may attempt to 
capitalize on the prospector’s work, just as Nemitz demanded 
US$0.20 per year from NASA for parking and storage of its 
probe. 198  The United Nations might try to establish an 
organization like the ISA or its planned-for “Enterprise,” and 
use prospectors’ technology, funds, and exploratory findings to 
acquire space resources for the United Nations itself.199 For the 
reasons set forth below, the United Nations would lack sufficient 
basis in international law and public policy to support any of the 
actions described above. 
The United Nations, or one of its subsidiaries, cannot 
establish that an asteroid and its resources are the common 
heritage of mankind because the “common heritage” principle 
is not a true international norm.200 The common heritage idea 
enjoys dubious authority under UNCLOS, and it has no 
standing in outer space after the failure of the Moon 
Agreement. 201  The common heritage principle, whatever it 
means, binds neither private space explorers nor the nations 
                                                                                                             
195. See Moon Agreement, supra note 134, art. 11, para. 5 (requiring States Parties 
to establish a space-governance regime as soon as resource exploitation is about to 
become feasible). 
196. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (describing how Nemitz attempted to 
claim 433 Eros just before NASA’s probe reached it). 
197. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text (describing how the Papacy 
asserted dominion over the entire world and granted certain monarchs the right to 
explore specified areas through instruments like the Bull Inter Caetera). 
198. See Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042 at *1 (describing how Nemitz demanded 
US$0.20 per year for parking and storage of the NEAR Shoemaker probe). 
199. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (describing the ISA and 
Enterprise’s planned redistribution of resources under UNCLOS). 
200. See supra note 88 (describing how only some developed nations acceded to 
UNCLOS, and only after the 1994 Protocol reduced the ISA’s power to distribute 
resources); supra notes 187–191 (describing how the Moon Agreement is not 
international law specifically because of objections to the common heritage problem). 
201. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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that host them, except perhaps the thirteen States Parties to the 
Moon Agreement.202 
With the legal failure of the common heritage principle 
established, it is useful to examine the policy implications of 
extraterrestrial sovereignty. European monarchs and the Vatican 
asserted a similar power, extraterritorial sovereignty, over 
foreign lands on Earth in order to maintain peace among 
explorers, promote the spread of their values, and increase their 
wealth and power.203 The grave consequences of extraterritorial 
sovereignty throughout the Age of Exploration reveal the 
dangers of this concept.204 Through the Moon Agreement, the 
United Nations attempted to lay the foundation for its own 
extraterrestrial sovereignty over all asteroids, and every other 
celestial body in the solar system, even though no one on Earth 
had touched or even seen the majority of these objects.205 
Extraterrestrial sovereignty is even more absurd because the 
Moon Agreement has failed, and the Outer Space Treaty, which 
enjoys more support, does not limit its own provisions to Earth’s 
solar system. 206  If the Outer Space Treaty is read to have 
established UN sovereignty in space, it would make that 
organization the master of all bodies outside of Earth’s 
atmosphere. 207  When one considers the vast multitude of 
celestial bodies in Earth’s solar system, and further notes that 
there are probably more than one hundred billion stars in our 
galaxy, plus untold millions of other galaxies in the universe, 
such a claim is breathtakingly arrogant.208 
                                                                                                             
202. See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text (describing the few nations 
that have ratified the Moon Agreement). 
203. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text (describing the causes and 
consequences of European extraterritorial sovereignty). 
204. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (describing the dangers of 
extraterritorial sovereignty). 
205. See NASA to Launch New Science Mission to Asteroid in 2016, NASA (May 25, 
2011), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/solarsystem/features/osiris-rex.html (describing 
the lack of human contact with asteroids); see also supra notes 134–45 and 
accompanying text (describing how the Moon Agreement attempted to establish UN 
control over space resources). 
206 . See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118 (lacking language limiting its 
provisions to Earth’s solar system). 
207. See id. 
208. See How Many Stars Are There in the Universe?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Feb. 23, 
2004), http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/How_many_stars_are_there_
in_the_Universe [hereinafter ESA] (describing the estimated number of stars and 
2013] THE PROSPECTOR'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 269 
The United Nations may cite environmental reasons for 
exercising sovereignty in space, but environmental interests are 
not the same in space as they are on Earth. There is little if any 
support in law or policy for the preservation of asteroids’ natural 
environments. 209  An incident on July 19, 2009, reveals the 
difference between the environmental interest on Earth and in 
space.210 That day, a large celestial body (between 80 and 160 
kilometers in diameter) slammed into the surface of Jupiter at 
ninety-nine kilometers per second.211 This was an event of some 
significance for that asteroid or comet, which exploded in a 
fireball one thousand times more powerful than the asteroid 
explosion over Tunguska, Siberia, in 1908.212 The Tunguska 
blast drew immediate concern in countries as far away as 
England, where its shock wave rattled scientific instruments.213 
However, on the day after astronomers observed Jupiter’s 2009 
explosion, the New York Times led with an article about ESPN’s 
efforts to corner the market on local sports stories.214 Five days 
later, when the Times finally reported the celestial body’s 
destruction, it pointed out Jupiter’s useful role in Earth’s solar 
system as a strong-gravity planet, which draws objects to crash 
into itself and thereby protects Earth from “space junk.”215 This 
“space junk” is exactly the sort of material that an 
                                                                                                             
galaxies in the universe as of 2004); see also Andrew Moseman, The Estimated Number of 
Stars in the Universe Just Tripled, DISCOVER (Dec. 1, 2010), http://blogs.
discovermagazine.com/80beats/2010/12/01/the-estimated-number-of-stars-in-the-
universe-just-tripled/#.UPx3XqFU6Ic (summarizing the findings of a Yale astronomy 
study that indicated previous star population estimates were too low). 
209. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text (describing the Outer Space 
Treaty’s apparent assertion of jurisdiction over explorers rather than sovereignty over 
space resources in its environmental provisions). 
210. See Mystery Impact Leaves Earth-Size Mark on Jupiter, CNN (July 21, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/space/07/21/jupiter.nasa.meteor.scar/index.htm; 
see also Hubble Space Telescope Captures Rare Jupiter Collision, NASA (July 24, 2009), 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/hubble/main/jupiter-hubble.html (describing 
the impact on Jupiter). 
211. See CNN, supra note 210; NASA, supra note 210. 
212. See CNN, supra note 210; NASA, supra note 210. 
213. See CNN, supra note 210; NASA, supra note 210. 
214. See Brooks Barnes, Across U.S., ESPN Aims to Be the Home Team, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 
20 2009, at A1 (describing the sports network’s attempts to appeal to local audiences). 
215. See Dennis Overbye, Jupiter: Our Cosmic Protector?, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2009, at 
WK7 (describing how Jupiter protects other planets from dangerous celestial bodies by 
drawing those objects to collide with itself). 
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environmental regime in space would attempt to preserve.216 
Left untouched by mankind, the only effect these bodies could 
have on Earth would be to eventually collide with this planet and 
kill large quantities of its life forms.217 
The distinction between environmental interests on Earth 
and in space also depends on the importance of sustainability. 
In a 2012 report, COPUOS expressed the view of some members 
that space resources should be developed in a “sustainable” 
manner.218 Sustainability is a significant concern on Earth, where 
resources are finite. 219  Resources in outer space, however, 
comfortably exceed the practical reach of human 
consumption.220 For instance, a modest-sized metallic asteroid 
may contain more platinum group metals than have been mined 
on Earth in human history.221 As noted above, there are far more 
than 500,000 asteroids of various types in this solar system 
alone.222 Every gram of platinum, silicon, or water consumed in 
                                                                                                             
216 . See, e.g., Moon Agreement supra note 134, art. 7 (providing for the 
preservation of environments in space). 
217. See generally Peter Schulte et al., The Chicxulub Asteroid Impact and Mass 
Extinction at the Cretaceous-Paleogene Boundary, 327 SCIENCE 1214 (2010); Maureen 
Oakes, Modeling an Asteroid Impact, LOS ALAMOS NAT’L LAB., http://www.lanl.gov/
quarterly/q_spring03/asteroid_text.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how 
the asteroid that struck Earth at what is now called the Chicxulub crater in Mexico 
probably caused the extinction of the dinosaurs as well as seventy percent of life on this 
planet). 
218. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 55th Sess., GAOR 67th Sess., 
Supp. No. 20, 9 (June 15, 2012) (noting some members’ advocacy for sustainable 
development of the outer space environment and its resources). 
219 . See, e.g., Millenium Development Goals, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, http:// 
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html (last viewed Mar. 29, 
2013) (listing “[e]nsure environmental sustainability” as their eighth goal). 
220 . How Big Is Our Universe?, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/audience/
foreducators/5-8/features/F_How_Big_is_Our_Universe.html (last visited Mar. 5, 
2013) (describing space objects 14 billion light years away from Earth). 
221. See ROSS, supra note 4, at 6 (explaining that a modestly-sized (1 kilometer) 
metallic asteroid would probably contain more platinum group metals than are 
available on Earth). 
222. See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1 (asserting that there are more than 500,000 
known asteroids in the solar system, and probably many more yet to be discovered); see 
also ESA, supra note 208 (describing hundreds of millions of stars in the Milky Way 
galaxy, and millions of galaxies in the universe). 
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space would leave untapped a more precious gram from Earth’s 
limited resources.223 
Even if international law were somehow construed to 
prohibit claims of private property over territory on celestial 
bodies, it would still not prohibit the acquisition and use of 
resources from those bodies.224 The first article of the Outer 
Space Treaty guarantees the right to use celestial bodies.225 
Representatives of the United States and Soviet Union made 
uncontested statements at the time of the Treaty’s passage that 
the term “use” includes the rights to acquire and possess 
resources from celestial bodies.226 As international law scholar 
(and aerospace engineer) Thomas Gangale put it, “If you want 
resources on Mars or the Moon, take them.”227 
B. Escape Velocity 
The first asteroid prospectors will probably launch 
spacecraft from the territory of some nation on Earth.228 Just as 
persons and corporations on Earth are subject to the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of their home governments when 
they engage in certain activities overseas, space prospectors will 
fall under the extraterrestrial jurisdiction of their launching 
states.229 When governments exercise extraterrestrial jurisdiction 
over their nationals in space, they can protect Earth and its 
                                                                                                             
223. See Stewart B. Whitney, Space Political Economy: Integrating Technology and 
Social Science for the 1990s, Third Annual Space Development Conference (April 
1990) (describing the environmental interest in developing space to preserve Earth). 
224. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 43 (arguing that individuals cannot acquire 
real property rights in space, but they may acquire and use space resources). 
225. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. I (guaranteeing the right to use 
celestial bodies). 
226. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 43. 
227. See id. 
228. Hypothetically, prospectors may also construct spacecraft in orbit, or they 
may use ocean launch-pads outside any nation’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., About Sea Launch, 
SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sea-launch.com/about.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2012); Sea 
Launch and Land Launch Projects, ENERGIA, http://www.energia.ru/en/launchers/
launchers.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (describing a sea-based floating commercial 
launch pad). 
229. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. VIII (recognizing States Parties’ 
jurisdiction over objects launched from their territories). 
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citizens from the negative impacts of asteroid mining. 230 
However, just as extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot justly extend 
a government’s sovereign territory onto foreign lands, an Earth 
government’s extraterrestrial jurisdiction cannot extend that 
government’s sovereignty over space territory and resources.231 
Any Earth government, including the United Nations, may take 
measures within its authority to ensure that space prospectors 
not crash asteroids into Earth or poison this planet with alien 
microbes.232 Earth governments may also intervene to prevent 
prospectors from harming each other. 233  However, no 
government can declare any territory or resources in space to be 
under its dominion.234 Space prospectors may therefore acquire 
space territory and its resources as first claimants and 
continuous users.235 Just as aboriginal title allowed societies on 
Earth to assert ownership of the territory they used regardless of 
whether some government granted them title, the first 
prospectors can rightfully claim any resources they use without 
asking the United Nations for permission.236 
                                                                                                             
230. See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. IX (requiring States Parties 
to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s environment through the introduction of 
extraterrestrial material). 
231. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1964) 
(holding that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not grant US courts the authority to rule 
upon a foreign sovereign’s public acts within that foreign sovereign’s territory). 
232. See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 118, art. IX (requiring States Parties 
to avoid adversely affecting Earth’s environment through the introduction of 
extraterrestrial material). 
233. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 606–07 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(holding that states exercise jurisdiction over their nationals’ conduct outside their 
territory through the “nationality principle,” and also holding that states have criminal 
jurisdiction to proscribe conduct by foreign nationals occurring outside of their own 
territory if the conduct has a substantial effect within their territory under the “effects 
principle,” or if the conduct is directed against a critical state interest under the 
“protective principle” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES §§ 402(1)–(2) (1986); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 
(1932); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
234. See Zullo, supra note 118, at 2419 (describing the “province of all mankind” 
language as meaning that space resources are subject to “the undivided and common 
use of all states on Earth . . . not joint [ownership] by them.” (quoting U.S.S.R. 
Working Paper, supra note 171 at 24–25)); see also Report of the Legal Subcommittee, 
supra note 180 (refusing to adopt an Italian proposal that would prohibit the return of 
scientific samples). 
235. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (describing aboriginal title 
requirements). 
236. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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Proponents of UN sovereignty in space are correct that 
property rights in the absence of sovereignty are less reassuring 
than property rights under sovereign protection.237 However, 
this does not mean that such property rights have no value at all. 
As stated above, a single asteroid could contain more platinum 
group metals than have ever been mined on Earth, and there 
are plenty of other precious resources on asteroids. 238 
Competing prospectors would have more than half a million 
asteroids from which to choose. 239  In the event that two 
prospectors set their sights on the same exact asteroid, they 
would have to resolve their differences without resorting to the 
authority of an Earth government.240 Indigenous peoples all over 
the Pacific enjoyed their lands for millennia without European 
supervision, which should give us hope that the explorers and 
residents of space will manage their affairs without a Bureau of 
Extraterrestrial Land Management in Vienna.241 Governments 
on Earth could discourage conflict by recording and publishing 
explorers’ claims without recognizing them, just as the United 
Nations does in its Law of the Sea Bulletin.242 Earth governments 
could also discourage conflicts by exercising extraterrestrial 
jurisdiction over victims and perpetrators of violence, just as 
nations currently exert authority over their citizens and those 
who would harm them in foreign lands or on the high seas.243 
Ultimately, though, it will be up to the settlers of space to 
establish the customs and relationships that maintain order in 
                                                                                                             
237 . See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 33–34 (asserting that property without 
sovereignty is not practically useful without the protection of armed force). 
238. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text (describing valuable resources in 
asteroids). 
239. See NASA, Asteroids, supra note 1 (explaining that there are more than 
500,000 known asteroids in Earth’s solar system). 
240 . See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text (explaining that Earth 
governments, including the United Nations, cannot extend their sovereignty to 
territory or resources in space). 
241 . See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (describing how Pacific 
Islanders settled their lands and established a right of ownership later recognized as 
aboriginal title). 
242. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (describing how the United 
Nations reduces the potential for conflict without recognizing deep seabed claims by 
publishing them in the Law of the Sea Bulletin). 
243. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (describing how governments may 
use extraterritorial jurisdiction to prevent people in foreign territory from harming 
each other). 
274 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:235 
their interactions. When they do, they will become their own 
sovereigns.244  
It is fitting that the beneficiaries of space commerce include 
societies that became their own sovereigns after exercising their 
rights under aboriginal title. To see how, this Note returns to 
the islands of the Kwajalein Atoll, where enterprising canoeists 
once made their homes on land that belonged to no person 
before. 245  The first inhabitants of those lands, when they 
imagined the future, could not have predicted that they would 
fall subject to centuries of colonial rule, nor that they would 
emerge in the Twentieth Century as an independent nation 
called the Republic of the Marshall Islands.246 Whatever they 
thought about their future, those first pioneers could not have 
conceived what would happen in the Kwajalein Atoll on 
September 28, 2008.247 At 4:15 pm that day, a rocket blasted off a 
launch pad surrounded by sand, palm trees, and turquoise blue 
water.248 The rocket pushed a small spacecraft into the sky, and 
quickly lifted it past the one-hundred-kilometer altitude 
boundary between airspace and outer space.249 The spacecraft 
then separated from its first stage rocket, fired its second stage, 
and propelled itself into Earth’s orbit, where it will likely remain 
until at least 2018. 250  The spacecraft, known as SpaceX 
Corporation’s Falcon 1 Flight 4, became the first privately built 
liquid fueled spacecraft to orbit the Earth.251 
As Kwajalein’s example shows, private space activity can 
benefit developing nations in a manner that satisfies the spirit of 
the common heritage principal, if not the letter of the Moon 
Agreement. Small nations like the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands can provide commercial launch facilities for space 
                                                                                                             
244. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “sovereign” as “a 
person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme authority”). 
245. See Hezel, supra note 39, at 3 (describing the settlement of the Marshall 
Islands). 
246. See Office of the President, Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 49 
(describing the history of the Marshall Islands). 
247. See SpaceX Falcon 1 Flight 4, Mission Summary in Pictures, SPACEX, http://
www.spacex.com/F1-004-summary.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing the 
Falcon 1 Flight 4 mission). 
248. See id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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businesses. 252  The United Nations, while frustrated in its 
ambition to control the universe’s bounty, should take solace in 
the knowledge that private enterprises can provide immediate 
benefits for nations that cannot yet build their own space 
vehicles.253 
The Age of Exploration once again offers a useful analogy. 
Some of Earth’s mightiest empires rose in small, resource-poor 
lands that provided good ports for commercial shipping.254 In 
the third millennium A.D., the proximity of many developing 
nations to Earth’s equator makes them prime candidates for 
launch pads, because Earth’s greater rotational speed at its 
central latitudes would assist spacecraft in reaching escape 
velocity.255 This accident of physics could give Somalia, Ecuador, 
and Papau New Guinea the kind of opportunities that Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, and Japan once enjoyed.256 
As a would-be prospector, you might wonder whether the 
United States will support your business. That remains to be 
seen. 257  Instead of concerning yourself with COPUOS 
proceedings in Vienna, you might lobby Congress for a Deep 
Space Hard Mineral Resources Act, similar to the Deep Seabed 
Hard Mineral Resources Act, which guarantees American 
                                                                                                             
252. See Sea Launch, supra note 230 (describing a floating ship-based commercial 
launch pad that can bring commercial space activity to any nation that wishes to host 
it). 
253. Id. 
254. See, e.g., SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE UNITED PROVINCES 
OF THE NETHERLANDS 210–11 (1705) (“Nor has Holland grown rich by any Native 
Commodities, but by force of Indu[s]try; by Improvement and Manufacture of all 
Foreign Growths; and by being the general Magazine of Europe, and furni[s]hing all 
Parts with whatever the Market wants or invites; and by their Sea-men, being, as they 
have properly been call’d, the common Carriers of the World.”); ADAM ANDERSON, 1 
AN HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE ORIGINS OF COMMERCE 
preface, v (1763) (“To the instrumentality of commerce alone, the Britannic Empire is, 
mo[s]t peculiarly, indebted for its opulence and grandeur; its improvement in arts and 
knowledge; and, in general, for the great bulk of its [s]olid comforts and 
conveniences.”). 
255. A Saturn Launch Site, NASA, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/pao/History/SP-4204/
ch1-2.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (describing how early NASA launch planners 
sought to take advantage of equatorial launch sites because of the Earth’s faster 
rotational velocity at the equator). 
256. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ATLAS 2 (Rand McNally 1994 ed. 1969) (depicting 
Somalia, Ecuador, and Papau New Guinea as nations lying on or near Earth’s equator). 
257. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text (describing varying US actions 
regarding property rights in space). 
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companies’ right to acquire deep seabed resources. 258  If 
Congress is not interested, you might take your business to a 
nation like Russia, whose law explicitly recognizes the property 
rights of space explorers.259  
CONCLUSION 
Governments on Earth, like the European monarchs who 
sponsored ancient conquests, monopolized space exploration 
until very recently.260 As opportunities for space travel grow and 
multiply through private industry, and as people and enterprises 
move into space in greater numbers and at greater distances, the 
residents of space will constitute wholly new societies, with their 
own interests, communication, and culture.261 Earth’s authorities 
should expect that as these pioneers develop the ability to 
support and govern themselves, they will grow restless of the 
political bonds which connected them with their old world.262 
When that day comes, the governments of Earth will find that 
this planet has no more right to those celestial bodies than the 
                                                                                                             
258. See Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473 
(2012). 
259. See Russian Federation, 1993, Law of the Russian Federation on Space 
Activity (June 20, 1993), art. 16 para. 4, available at http://www.jaxa.jp/library/
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260. Will Oremus, Deep Space Mine, SLATE (May 11, 2012), http://www.slate.com/
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in the “space race” were governments, particularly the United States and what is now 
Russia). 
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AUGUSTINE LAWLER, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON THE ORIGIN AND PERPETUATION OF 
HUMAN LIBERTY 14 (1993) (describing one of Tocqueville’s most celebrated 
contributions to political science as the “revolution of rising expectations”). 
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monarchs of Europe could claim over Kwajalein.263 It will then 
be clear, if it is not already, that those celestial bodies are not 
the common heritage of people in Vienna, New York, or 
Moscow.264 Those territories will be the common heritage of the 
people who live there, the descendants of those who claimed 
lands that belonged to no one before.265 It will be time to let 
them go, so that they can assume among the powers of the 
universe a separate and equal station.266 
The rest is just rocket science. 
 
                                                                                                             
263. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (describing the disastrous 
effects of extraterritorial sovereignty). It might seem bizarre in modern times to expect 
that extraterrestrial sovereignty would bring back old colonial evils like mercantilism 
and the Spanish Inquisition. See GANGALE, supra note 78, at 113 (arguing that 
opponents of the Moon Agreement are wrong to block its ratification due to some 
“trepidation over the shape of things to come”). But see supra notes 90–93 and 
accompanying text (describing how the drafters of UNCLOS attempted to create the 
Enterprise, a neo-mercantilist UN mining company). See generally MONTY PYTHON’S 
FLYING CIRCUS: The Spanish Inquisition (BBC television broadcast Sep. 22, 1970) 
(“Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition.”). 
264. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the 
Moon Agreement and its common heritage principle). 
265. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text (describing how asteroid 
prospectors can claim celestial bodies in accordance with the principle of aboriginal 
title). 
266. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776). 
